

Chapter 10 (12/28/05)

The Political Consequences of Anti-Americanism¹

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Why should we care about anti-Americanism? Does anti-Americanism have immediate, direct political impacts on activities that could be harmful to Americans, adverse for U.S. influence, or detrimental to world order? Does it have longer-term, indirect effects that are not readily recognizable at a particular historical juncture but come into full view only later? How should we think about possible longer-term effects that are not yet apparent? This chapter argues that the direct and immediate consequences of anti-Americanism are surprisingly hard to identify. But it also develops a perspective on how to think about the longer-term consequences of anti-American attitudes. To understand the consequences of attitudes for policy and world politics, one has to trace their effects on social movements and especially on the nature of political regimes: that is, one needs to study not only opinion, bias, and distrust, but their organization and institutionalization.

¹ We presented earlier drafts of this chapter at two workshops on anti-Americanism held at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, January 21-22, April 8, and June 9-11, 2005 as well as a seminar hosted by the Political Science Department of the University of California, Berkeley on March 29, 2005, and a public lecture at the University of Southern California, April 28, 2005. Robert Keohane presented a version of this paper to a seminar at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University on May 26, 2005. We are grateful to all participants for their helpful comments, criticisms and suggestions. We are particularly grateful to Naazneen Barma, Miles Kahler, Doug McAdam Barak Mendelsohn, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and John Gerard Ruggie for their careful reading and trenchant comments on prior drafts, and to Susan Shirk for pointing out to us, early on, that our emperor was wearing no clothes.

In discussing the consequences of anti-Americanism, we need first to remind ourselves of three important distinctions made in the introduction and throughout this volume. First, anti-Americanism needs to be sharply differentiated from opposition to United States policy. Sometimes observers refer to policy opinions that differ from those of the U.S. government, such as opposition to the war in Iraq or support for the International Criminal Court, as “anti-American.” This is a big mistake. If it were anti-American to hold views different from those of the U.S. government, many loyal Americans would be “anti-American,” and the Bill of Rights would be meaningless.

The second distinction that we need to recall is that among opinion, distrust, and bias. Figure 1 of the introduction introduced the idea of a continuum between unbiased opinion and systematic bias, with distrust at an intermediate category. The problem, as we noted there, is that most of our systematic information, from public opinion polls, is about opinion rather than bias. It is very difficult, as we argued, to distinguish opinion based on policy disagreements from opinion based on distrust or bias. Yet over time critical opinion can harden into distrust and distrust into bias. Critical opinion thus is politically consequential in the short-term, and it is the ground from which can spring, over the longer-term, distrust and bias. When we discuss the consequences of “anti-Americanism” in this chapter, we will mostly be commenting on the consequences of anti-American opinion.

The third major distinction to remember is that expressed in our typology of anti-Americanisms in chapter 1. We identified four major types of anti-Americanism: liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical. These types of anti-Americanism can be

expected to matter more or less depending on the context, and to have different types of effects. Liberal and social forms of anti-Americanism are chiefly found in democratic societies, and might affect cooperation with the United States by countries normally disposed to work closely with America. Sovereign-nationalist anti-Americanism is more prevalent outside than within Europe, and can be found in authoritarian states, such as China, or democratic ones, such as Mexico. Radical anti-Americanism is now widespread only in the Middle East, although pockets of it can be found elsewhere. We will not belabor these distinctions in our discussion of the consequences of anti-Americanism below, but they should be kept in mind.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first three sections investigate the possible consequences of anti-American opinion in three distinct political domains in which anti-American opinion could have political consequences for the United States. Section 1 discusses the effects of anti-American opinion on the war against terrorism. Anti-Americanism could make it harder to fight terrorism. Such an impact could be exerted in one of two ways. Anti-Americanism could provide a “breeding ground for terrorism,” by helping terrorist organizations recruit activists and by creating a pool of sympathizers and supporters of terrorism. Just as communist guerillas were once said to move like a “fish in the friendly sea of the people,” members of Al-Qaeda, for example, depend on help from sympathizers. Without food, shelter, money, logistical support, and a willingness to protect them, terrorists cannot operate effectively, either in rural or urban areas. Or anti-Americanism could hinder cooperation on counter-terrorism between governments. Distrust of the United States, or bias against it, could conceivably lead

other governments to refuse to participate in American-led efforts to track down and disrupt terrorist networks.

The discussion of terrorism raises one aspect of a broader issue we discuss in Section 2: whether anti-Americanism will prevent the United States from achieving important political objectives that can only be attained through extensive international cooperation. In the election campaign of 2004, Senator John Kerry argued that the policies of the Bush Administration had unnecessarily antagonized America's natural friends and allies, making it more difficult for the United States to attain its goals. Has the United States been hindered in its attempts to persuade other states to accede to its requests, on a variety of issues, without the interference of anti-American views? Anti-Americanism is often claimed to undercut American "soft power." Much of the influence of the United States in the world seems to depend on the power of its example and its ability to persuade others. One might therefore surmise that if America is viewed negatively rather than positively, its persuasive ability would diminish, requiring it to use more "hard power" – in the form of material resources -- to obtain its objectives, if they can be obtained at all. If this effect is important, there should be a discernible impact of anti-Americanism on the ability of the United States to obtain its objectives through multilateral diplomacy. With respect to this set of questions, we must be careful not to confuse cause and effect. An observed association between anti-Americanism and opposition to U.S. policy does not necessarily imply that anti-Americanism caused the opposition. The reverse could equally well be the case. Indeed, American soft power could well be damaged by American foreign policies, as a result of those policies'

adverse effects on public opinion abroad, quite independently of these publics' prior views toward the United States. In such a situation, it would not be anti-Americanism that led to a reduction in American soft power, but United States policy itself.

Section 3 focuses not on governments' behavior but on the actions of individuals and groups. Various journalistic reports have suggested that anti-Americanism has led to formal or informal boycotts of corporations identified with the United States. If many people are biased against the United States, as consumers they could have measurable, adverse effects on U.S. corporations. Furthermore, it seems plausible that anti-Americanism could have negative economic consequences through a reduction in U.S.-bound tourism. It is relatively easy for tourists to change their destinations, and it seems intuitively as if people who are hostile to the United States would be less likely to visit, as tourists, than those who have favorable views toward it.

In view of the attention that anti-Americanism has received in the media and by politicians, it is surprising how little hard evidence can be found, in any of these three domains, that anti-American opinion has had serious direct and immediate consequences for the United States on issues affecting broad U.S. policy objectives. Cooperation between the United States and its allies, on issues such as terrorism and on more general issues of international diplomacy, has not been disrupted. Furthermore, we find little evidence of actions by individuals, motivated by anti-Americanism, to boycott American products or refuse to visit the United States. In the absence of stronger evidence, skepticism is justified about assertions that anti-Americanism has had major effects on the capacity of the United States to conduct a successful foreign policy.

Our failure to find strong evidence that anti-Americanism has specific and measurable effects supports the argument of Giacomo Chiozza in chapter 4 that, with the exception of the Arab Middle East, bias is not yet deeply embedded in global public opinion. In a sense, our null findings shift the burden of proof toward those who believe that anti-Americanism is having major effects. Yet our findings by no means prove that anti-Americanism is inconsequential. We note in this chapter that anti-American views may have had an important impact at critical junctures -- such as the March, 2003 decision by the Turkish Parliament not to permit an attack on Iraq from Turkish territory, or the September 2002 re-election campaign by Chancellor Schröder in Germany in which he committed himself to refuse participation in a possible invasion of Iraq under any circumstance even if the invasion were sanctioned by the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the tests that we employ below are quite stringent. We ask whether there is clear evidence that states, or members of the public, have acted on negative views toward the United States despite interests that they may have to the contrary.² Yet while policy-makers' concern for their national or personal interests could lead them to avoid overtly anti-American actions, the initiatives they take or from which they refrain could be subtly affected by pervasive anti-American attitudes.³ In regions of the world that this volume does not cover, notably Latin America, distrust and bias have increased rapidly in recent years as left-wing governments are taking over in the wake of wide-spread disappointment with the effects of the neo-liberal policies supported by the United

² This point has been made strongly to us by John Gerard Ruggie.

³ In personal communication (October 24, 2005) Andrei Markovits has emphasized his view that in Europe, elites share an "acutely felt and openly articulated continent-wide anti-Americanism," although he agrees with us that "antipathies, though substantial, will not be allowed to interfere with interests."

States.⁴ The large demonstrations against the United States that greeted President Bush in Mar del Plata, Argentina, in November 2005 illustrate the intensity of opposition to United States policy in large segments of Latin American publics.

Section 4 shifts attention to the possible indirect and longer-term effects of anti-Americanism. It reinforces these points and provides a counter-balance to the generally negative findings of Sections 1-3. The effects of anti-American sentiment could well be more subtle, and operate more indirectly, than the measures we use in Sections 1-3 are capable of detecting. Widespread critical opinion can open the door in democratic polities for elites to use anti-Americanism as a way of mobilizing resources and support for their electoral campaigns and other favored causes. Furthermore, if anti-Americanism is widespread, and if a country does not depend for its protection or for other forms of support on the United States, politicians may have few incentives to defend the U.S. or criticize anti-American pronouncements. The eventual result can be the development of uncontested “background knowledge” that embodies a pervasive bias toward the United States and its policies. The chapters by Sophie Meunier and John Bowen show that anti-Americanism is embedded deeply in the policy discourse of France. Marc Lynch’s chapter argues similarly that different forms of anti-Americanism also mark profoundly political discourse in Egypt and the Arab world more generally. And the chapter by Alastair I. Johnston and Dani Stockmann shows how entrenched distrust of the United States is among the population of Beijing. Finally, Doug McAdam’s chapter contains a

⁴ Sweig 2005. Kathryn Sikkink has also emphasized this point to us.

subtle and wide-ranging analysis of how legacies of bad relations with the United States can either become entrenched over time, or change dramatically with new events.

In view of recent highly unfavorable publicity about American human rights practices at Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib, and elsewhere, there is reason for serious concern that even if anti-Americanism has not yet had dramatic foreign policy effects, it could become endemic and increasingly important in years to come. Our failure to identify *immediate and specific* consequences of anti-American opinion in recent years should not be read as dismissing the long-term importance of anti-Americanism. The continuing outrage, abroad and at home, over United States human rights practices, and the Bush administration's defense of both indefinite detention and measures that arguably constitute torture, offer, with respect to the longer-term effects of anti-Americanism, no grounds for complacency.

Anti-Americanism and the Struggle against Terrorism

Throughout the world in 2002, as Chiozza shows in chapter 4, of all the different components associated with attitudes toward the United States, the war on terror is most closely associated with negative views of the U.S. and engenders the largest shift in the probability to dislike the United States. When Americans think about the consequences of this spread of anti-Americanism, two ideas typically dominate the discussion. First, are anti-American views a fertile breeding ground for terrorism? Second, do anti-American views hinder the efforts of the U.S. government to organize joint actions with others to combat terrorism? We consider these two possible effects in turn.

Is Anti-Americanism a Breeding Ground for Terrorism?

One of the most frequently cited and dreaded effects of Anti-Americanism is as a breeding ground for future generations of potential terrorists. In a 2004 poll conducted in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), across a total of 15 questions, respondents expressed more than twenty times as many unfavorable as favorable views of U.S. policy toward Arabs, the Palestinians, and the war in Iraq.⁵ In a public opinion poll that the Pew Foundation conducted in 2004, pluralities of respondents in Pakistan, Jordan and Morocco justified suicide bombings under some circumstances, and against Americans and other Westerners in Iraq.⁶ The figures in Indonesia were much lower in 2003, when 27 percent thought that suicide bombings were often or sometimes justified.⁷ Fears that anti-Americanism is a breeding ground for terrorism are thus most relevant in Muslim societies, particularly in the Middle East, and with respect to small groups of the Muslim Diaspora in Europe and Canada.⁸

What we know about earlier formations of left-wing terrorist groups, such as the Red Army and the Red Cells in Germany, Japan, and Italy in the 1960s and 1970s, suggests that hatred of a regime and its policies is part of an exceedingly complex set of

⁵ Zogby International 2004, 3.

⁶ Pew Research Center for the People & the Press 2004, 33-34 (Questions 13, 15).

⁷ By 2005, that figure was only 9 percent, as noted in Table 1 above. *Terror Free Tomorrow* 2005, 4.

⁸ See especially Sageman 2004, 25-59. Stern 2003, 3-137. Data on Canada are sketchy. We do know, however, that terror-related money laundering in Canada in fiscal 2004-05 is estimated to double from the previous year to \$140 million, according to Horst Intscher, director of Canada's Financial Transactions and Report Analysis Centre

processes. Based in part on extended interviews with terrorists who had been incarcerated, scholars such as Donatella della Porta, Patricia Steinhoff and Gilda Zwerman have reconstructed how social movement activists grew over time more radical and at a crucial moment decided to form clandestine terrorist cells.⁹ More important than the decision to commit violent acts was the decision to move underground from a radical social movement milieu and prior network ties. Break-away groups created networks, often only loosely linked if at all, which recruited activists, often accidentally, whose identities were then formed and reformed by peer group pressures among activists. Spirals of radicalization fed on social isolation and constricted political vocabulary and conceptions of political action. Violence was not calculated as a matter of individual choice but emerged from a set of group processes. Radicalization and escalation of violence accompanied a progressive militarization of the conflict, growing commitment to abstract and non-realizable goals, intensification in the vilification of the other, and growing political isolation and creating of a small community of the like-minded. The search for revolutionary authenticity through violence was exceedingly complex.¹⁰

We do not know how much resemblance the politics of fundamentalist Islamists committed to jihad bears to that of radical left-wing activists in Europe and Asia in the 1960s-1980s. However, they have some common elements. In both situations, hatred is a motivating factor. Islamic militants, like the earlier European radicals, seek

(Fintrac). <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/World/WarOnTerrorism/2004/11/04/700533-cp.html>. Accessed 03/23/2005.

⁹ Zwerman, Steinhoff and della Porta 2000.

¹⁰ Katzenstein 1997, 13-21.

empowerment through violence.¹¹ And both cohorts of terrorists are organized in cells, loosely linked in networks. But it seems likely that the nature of terrorist politics differs between societies in which there is widespread sympathy for their goals, such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, and those in which they are no more than a tiny, if feared, minority as was true in Europe and Japan in the 1970s and 1980s. In the case of contemporary jihadists, recruitment in Europe and Canada focus on men who had emigrated from their native countries and had weak links to the societies in which they lived.¹²

In recent decades, jihadist movement politics has come in three historical stages. The first stage was the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. One of the war's main effects was to revive the notion of jihad as a collective duty. Equally important, the war against the Soviet Union helped forge strong personal links among the many volunteers who came from many different countries and learned how to fight side by side. The contribution of Arabs in the war was small in terms of numbers. But the impact of Muslim NGOs and activists was major. The states who supported the Mujahideen (the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan) lost control over the radicals who were intent on exporting jihad beyond Afghanistan, based on the strong interpersonal links that had been forged and the extremist ideology that they had come to adopt during the war.

The second phase occurred in the 1990s. The veterans of the Afghan war tried, and failed, to win their separate struggles against their home governments, for example in Algeria and Egypt. Other Jihadist struggles in the periphery of the Muslim world – in Kashmir, Bosnia and Chechnya – also brought little success. Al Qaeda under Osama bin

¹¹ Juergensmeyer 2000, 214.

Laden's leadership then emerged as a regional and eventual global network that provided organizational and ideological support also for local Jihadist movements. This was the political context for Bin Laden's strategy of attacking the United States in order to eventually eliminate the Saudi regime. Afghanistan and later Western Pakistan become the national training ground for a new phase of the struggle.

The 9/11 attacks on the United States and the American response initiated the third phase. The conflict between radical Islam and the United States has become global. Radical Islam can be found in the Islamic Diaspora rapidly growing in democratic, postmodern Europe, in the modernizing, authoritarian states dominating the Middle East, and embryonically perhaps also in Southeast Asia. Even the outbreak of strictly local violence is now framed by both sides as evidence of the existence of a global struggle. This change in perception rescued the movement from the problems of collective action that came with the elimination of its territorial sanctuary in Afghanistan. It also made up for resource scarcities and factional infighting. Various groups can operate locally or globally, although most of them continue to operate with greatest ease in the Middle East. The Iraqi insurgency is currently the central stage for Jihadist politics. Al-Qaeda hopes to draw the U.S. deep into a protracted conflict that Bin Laden had vainly hoped for in Afghanistan. American allies fear that the return of fighters to the Middle East and Europe who have been trained in the Iraq insurgency, will eventually shift the sites of violence while spreading the anti-American and anti-Western thrust of Jihadist movement politics.

¹² Sageman 2004. Stern 2003.

The U.S. occupation of Iraq, by most accounts, attracted hundreds of Muslim militants from Europe to fight the Americans. In the words of one high-ranking German police official, “the war in Iraq has somehow mobilized this scene so that people who before just had some sort of contact or sympathies with extremist groups now think they have to do something.”¹³ Although this exodus to Iraq has been much smaller than the departure from Europe of thousands of Muslims in the 1980s to fight in Afghanistan,¹⁴ it poses a serious threat. France’s top anti-terrorism judge, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, reflected a broad view among European counter-terrorism experts when he warned publicly that a more fragmented Al-Qaeda has become a bigger threat than before.¹⁵ The war in Iraq has created a new and more dangerous generation of younger, more radical groups of Islamic extremists, many of whom have been trained and battle-hardened through their participation in the insurgency against the U.S. occupation of Iraq. According to Balthazar Garzon, Spain’s leading magistrate prosecuting Islamic terrorists, this “second generation” has in many cases no history of affiliation with Al-Qaeda or other established terrorist organizations. Terror cells recruit over the internet or in jails, primarily among second generation immigrants with dim life chances at the periphery of European society. Holding European passports, these recruits have ready access to North America. They organize around loose constellations of personal relationships rather than cells linked in a network structure: for them, Al-Qaeda is an ideological reference point rather than an organizational structure. Lacking any contacts to extremist groups, these constellations

¹³ Rising 2005.

¹⁴ Rising 2005. Haahr-Escolano 2005. Sciolino 2005a,b.

are very difficult to track for intelligence and law-enforcement agencies. Roger Cressey, the White House deputy counter-terrorism coordinator in the first Bush administration concedes that the creation of a new cadre of hardened Islamic terrorists was “one of the biggest unintended consequences of the war in Iraq. The administration had no appreciation of the danger of creating a new cadre of jihadis.”¹⁶

The number of fighters who left their home countries in the Middle East, or Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban, to fight in Iraq appears to be much larger than those leaving Europe. The threat they pose to the Gulf states is considerably greater than the threat to Europe. One study shows that 60 percent of foreign fighters killed in Iraq were from Saudi Arabia compared to only a handful from Europe.¹⁷ In contrast to Europe or the United States the effects of Iraq as a regional training ground for terrorists are already very much in evidence in bloody gun battles and bombing attacks in the small Gulf states and Saudi Arabia.¹⁸ The primary target of Al-Qaeda has not been the United States. For many years Al-Qaeda has sought chiefly to destroy the political regimes in Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states; more recently, it has focused much of its attention and resources on Iraq. And while anti-Americanism is surely a very important part of the insurgency, so is the fear of Shiite ascendancy that is mobilizing Sunnis and Salafis. The

¹⁵ BBC NEWS <http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/4595313.stm> (accessed 05/31/2005).

¹⁶ Cofer Black, the State Department’s chief counter-terrorism expert between 2002 and 2005, predicts “that the quality of all our lives will change . . . as measures previously considered needed (only) in forward areas will increasingly be . . . adopted in our home countries.” Both quotations are in Waterman 2005. It remains to be seen whether the Iraq war is transforming AlQuaeda from a network of cells into a regional or global jihad as a highly placed CIA operative argues. See Anonymous, 2001, 2004.

¹⁷ Waterman 2005.

fear of Shiite influence emanating from Iran and now Iraq is deeply disruptive of a region in which prior to February 2003 18 of 21 countries were ruled by Sunnis.¹⁹

As was true of West European terrorists a couple of decades ago, anti-Americanism interacts with a host of other factors. In the squalid housing projects in the suburbs of Europe's major cities, with unemployment rampant, and channels for upward social mobility all but closed, different branches of Islam, somewhat reminiscent of radical Black activism in the United States in the late 1960s, offer political options that are attractive to more than a few. In France alone the number of converts to Islam numbers in the tens of thousands in recent years. The Islam they choose is not a uniform set of doctrines and practices. The small number of adherents of jihad, for example, are in constant rivalry with the much larger number of explicitly nonviolent and pietistic followers of Islam who are intent on total separation from secular Europe and the West. The clashes within and between these different groupings are intense and are played out in European chat rooms on the internet. Anti-Americanism plays a role in these political debates and struggles, but since the setting for these trends is Europe, the salience of anti-Americanism is smaller than, for example, in the Middle East.²⁰

We lack reliable information about the precise effects of anti-Americanism as a breeding ground of militant Islamists. With due caution we conclude that among a complex set of factors, anti-American attitudes most probably have a mobilizing effect that is motivating individuals and small groups to act violently against Americans, and

¹⁸ Ambah 2005. Watkins 2005. Moamen 2005.

¹⁹ Aslan 2005. Smith 2005. Barak Mendelsohn personal communication March 23, 2005.

²⁰ Keppel 2004, 241-87. Stern 1999, 69-86 and 2003. Sageman 2004. Burdman 2003.

that this effect is much stronger in the Middle East than in Europe or North America. It seems quite plausible, considering the dynamic changes from the first to successive generations of extremists, that the enhanced recruitment of younger cohorts of extremists will pose serious security risks for Europe and North America in the future.

Counter-Terrorist Government Policies

What are the effects of anti-Americanism on governments that are participating in the War on Terror or that are potential targets of jihadist attacks? Is widespread anti-Americanism reflected in the initial reaction of especially the European allies of the United States and the subsequent evolution of the deployment of NATO forces in Afghanistan? Have anti-American views encouraged greater military cooperation among European NATO members that are growing distrustful of U.S. policies? Are such views reflected in the debates occurring in and decisions taken by various multilateral fora, such as the UN or the G8 Summit Meetings? And, finally, can we track the effects of anti-American views in the policies of democratic or authoritarian governments in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia? Generally speaking, the data suggest negative answers to most of these questions. If we can trust the public record, despite the spread of anti-American views, military, diplomatic, police and intelligence cooperation have intensified greatly since 9/11.

NATO and Afghanistan. Right after 9/11 European publics reacted with a heartfelt outpouring of sympathy for Americans, with hundreds of thousands marching in the streets in a massive display of public support for the United States. Contrary to the

widely-reported claim of Robert Kagan, furthermore, public, as opposed to elite and government opinion, on both sides of the Atlantic was largely similar in its reaction.²¹

And government policy mirrored public views. In reaction to the attacks and against the initially perceptible opposition of the U.S., NATO invoked the collective defense provision in Article 5 of the NATO treaty.²²

Even though anti-Americanism increased sharply in late 2002, NATO began at precisely that time to plan, in response to U.S. demands, for its first-ever out-of-area deployment -- in Afghanistan. As the war in Iraq began to loom larger and larger in 2002, fierce opponents of the war, such as Germany, Canada and Turkey, and reluctant supporters, like the Netherlands, agreed that NATO should take over the command of the peace-keeping operations in Afghanistan. For Germany, this agreement reflected a fundamental change in policy. In fact all 26 NATO members contributed to the NATO contingent, deployed initially under German-Dutch command in early 2003 until NATO stepped in formally in August 2003 to assume full command. At the time of the October 2003 Afghan election, 95 percent of the 5,500 peace-keepers serving in Afghanistan were NATO troops. Troop deployments have subsequently expanded, and troops have moved out of Kabul to include other provincial capitals. These NATO troops are complementing about 18,000 U.S. troops still hunting Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

NATO's deployment in Afghanistan, which took place quietly as the largest-ever, world-wide anti-war demonstrations were held in February 2003, is proof of the insulation of the war on terror from the strong anti-American views of mass publics. Of

²¹ Isernia and Everts, 2005. Kagan, 2003.

about 7,800 German troops stationed abroad in June 2004, some 40 percent were directly engaged in counter-terror missions, including 2,300 soldiers stationed in Afghanistan, and Germany has also hosted two international conferences addressing Afghanistan.²³ There is nothing surprising about any of this. German and European mass publics and governments see an effective war on terrorism and a lasting reconstruction of Afghanistan to be very much in their interest. What they oppose strongly is the American penchant for militarizing the war, for expanding the war's aim to include unrelated objectives such as the spread of democracy, and for acting unilaterally in the pursuit of American interests. The fact that anti-American views did not undermine close cooperation in Afghanistan as the core of the war on terror is a first indication of its limited effect, also readily observable in other multilateral settings.

The American War in Iraq and European Defense Cooperation. What has been the effect of the unilateral turn in U.S. foreign policy and the war it is waging in Iraq on the military cooperation among its European allies? European commitment to an institutionalization of defense cooperation has grown gradually especially in the 1990s. The Balkan wars and the war in Kosovo gave European governments conclusive proof that they lacked the necessary military capabilities, and that they could no longer count on America's military support for keeping peace on Europe's border. Prime Minister Tony Blair altered long-standing British defense policy when in December 1998 he agreed with French President Jacques Chirac that the European Union needed to acquire operational military capabilities. At the subsequent July 1999 summit the European

²² Lansford 2002, 60-83. Tuschhoff 2002, 2003.

Union agreed to take over the crisis management tasks of the West European Union (WEU) and committed itself to a common European security and defense policy. By the end of 1999 the EU committed itself to create a military force of 60,000 ready to be mobilized in 60 days, and equipped for a deployment of up to one year.²⁴ French President Chirac argued repeatedly that “the multipolar world France is seeking will provide balance and harmony. But it will not be feasible unless Europe is organised and able to play its role on the international stage.”²⁵ And German Chancellor Schröder moved in July 2001 away from the traditional German position that had sought always to balance NATO and EU when he argued: “We have to learn to treat differences of opinion and divergent interest [between NATO and EU] responsibly, should they arise.”²⁶ This shift in European policy and perspective occurred prior to the contested election of President Bush in November 2000.

American reaction to the gradual emergence of a more autonomous European military capability has varied among ambivalence, skepticism and hostility. During the brief war in Afghanistan the Europeans took issue with the American preference for a purely military response. European reaction to the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States, which was announced in September 2002, was largely critical, especially to the doctrine’s emphasis on unilateralism or merely ad hoc multilateral arrangements. The war in Iraq, waged only with the support of Britain and the nominal support of a “coalition of the willing,” deepened the trans-Atlantic rift.

²³ Congressional Research Service 2004, 9-11.

²⁴ Katzenstein 2005, 130-32.

²⁵ Chirac 2000.

Significantly, the tensions between Britain, France and Germany over the Iraq war did not interfere with the new EU defense dialogue. In September 2003, at a meeting requested by the British government, Europe's "big three" agreed to establish a strategic and operational military planning body inside the European Defense and Security Policy (EDSP), outside of NATO. In December 2003 the EU adopted its Common Security Strategy paper. The following year EU governments agreed to a European Armaments Agency, the creation of a civil-military planning body within the EU Military Staff, development of a European Airlift Command, and to ready, by 2008, an aircraft carrier with air wing and escort.

The emergence of a European defense initiative, we conclude, predates the wave of anti-Americanism that swept Europe in 2002 and 2003. But distrust of the American approach to the war on terror has propelled a series of European defense initiatives, with full support of the British government.

Multilateral Fora. Since the early 1960s the UN has set up a number of specialized agencies addressing issues of terrorism, including a Counter-Terrorism Office located in Vienna. Although the General Assembly has not yet arrived at a consensual definition of the term 'terrorism,' over the decades a norm against terrorism has spread.²⁷ The UN has adopted 12 international counter-terrorism conventions, open to signature and ratification by all UN members. After seven years of negotiations, in April 2005, the General Assembly passed unanimously a nuclear terrorism treaty that requires states to

²⁶ Schröder 2001.

²⁷ The United Nations seems to be moving toward an agreed definition of terrorism. See High-Level Panel, paragraph 164, and Annan, 2005, paragraph 91.

prosecute or extradite individuals found in possession of atomic devices or radioactive materials. “By its action,” U.S. deputy ambassador Stuart Holliday said, “the General Assembly has shown that it can, when it has the political will, play an important role in the global fight against terrorism.”²⁸ Between 1996 and 2004 the UN Security Council passed 25 resolutions condemning acts of terrorism.²⁹ By spring 2004 all 191 UN members had filed first-round implementation reports with the Counter-Terrorism Committee established by UN Security Council Resolution 1373, passed on September 28, 2001, which called on members to become party to the 12 UN conventions and various regional documents condemning terrorism.³⁰

Unusually, this Resolution imposes uniform requirements on all UN member states and thus has been highly effective in pressuring Third World countries to comply. In addition, as of May 2005, 12 Third World states had passed domestic anti-terror legislation with minimal delay; 7 states passed such legislation after extensive debate; and in another 5 states such debate was continuing in 2005. In general more authoritarian governments were much more ready to constrain domestic freedom than less authoritarian or democratic ones. On this issue multilateralism is widely perceived as a screen for U.S. pressure and complying is widely interpreted as a way of currying favor with the United States. The perceived heavy-handedness of the U.S. fosters distrust in countries such as Kenya and South Africa. Negative effects of the new law are likely to

²⁸ Quoted in *The New York Times* (April 14, 2005): A6.

²⁹ Mendelsohn, 2005a.

³⁰ Council on Foreign Relations 2004, 9. Three committees of the UN Security Council coordinate a global sanction regime against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, counter-terrorism activities, the tracking of weapons of mass destruction.

fuel further distrust, especially in countries such as Morocco and Tunisia which are at the very beginning in moving toward liberalization and democratization.³¹

Starting in 2002 the G8 leaders launched a global partnership based on six principles that were designed to further collaborative action to prevent terrorists and those who harbor them from acquiring weapons of mass destruction as well as missile and related technologies. Subsequent meetings reinforced that commitment by creating a counter-terrorism action group which is cooperating closely with the UN and regional organizations and by undertaking other counter-terrorism initiatives. These measures build on 31 similar declarations that the G8 issued between 1975 and 2001.³² The G8 summits thus express a long-standing and widely shared consensus among heads of states to combat terrorism. Furthermore, compliance with resolutions against terrorism passed by the G8 is twice as high as for other issues. Only eight days after 9/11 the G8 leaders reiterated their renewed commitment to jointly fight terrorism.³³

When the United States demanded action, its international partners were eager to respond. For example, military planners from 68 states met in Bucharest in May 2005 to plan cooperation in the war on terror, ten more than attended the Warsaw meeting in October 2004.³⁴ Furthermore, legislation passed by the U.S. Congress at the end of 2002 required that by July 2004 all ports in the world have in place counterterrorism systems. The legislation permits the U.S. to deny entry to any ship should any of the last 10 ports at which it has taken cargo or passengers on board not meet new U.S. standards.

³¹ Whitaker 2005, 6, 10-14.

³² Belelieu, 2002, 20.

³³ Belelieu 2002, 15, 21.

Pressured by the U.S. government, the International Maritime Organization adopted the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code in December 2002, to be enforced by July 2004, which, in the words of Elizabeth De Sombre, “greatly increase the transparency of most ships flying flags of convenience.”³⁵ Within 18 months the IMO reported that worldwide 86 percent of the ships and 69 percent of the ports met the new requirements.³⁶ The new measures were intrusive and costly, yet states were eager to comply in record time.

The summit machinery involves not only the heads of states but also ministers of finance, foreign, interior and justice as well as G8 experts, such as the Counter-Terrorist group. As early as October 2001 the finance ministers of the G7, submitted an action plan designed to combat the financing of terrorist activities. The 12th UN counter-terrorism convention and the Financial Aid Taskforce’s Eighth Special Recommendations on Terrorist Finance also focused on these issues.³⁷ National legislation in the United States, Britain, the European continent, the Middle East and southwest Asia has complemented these international actions. Significantly, although there remain unresolved issues, a series of bombing attacks in 2003 and 2004 on targets in Saudi Arabia has moved the policy of the Saudi government closer to the international norm.³⁸ In September 2001

³⁴ osint@yahoogroups.com (accessed 05/26/2005).

³⁵ DeSombre 2005, 177. We are grateful to Professor DeSombre for sharing with us portions of her soon to be published book manuscript.

³⁶ DeSombre 2005, 177.

³⁷ Winer and Roule 2002; Belelieu 2002, 15.

³⁸ Council on Foreign Relations 2004, 3-5, 11-25, 27-29.

only four states had ratified the international Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. By the end of April 2004 that number had increased to 117.³⁹

A final example of multilateral cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) which the U.S. government launched in May 2003. Its aim is to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to non-nuclear states and terrorist groups. The PSI is an instance of creating a coalition of states willing to support the United States in its effort to plug the evident holes in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that now make it possible for non-nuclear states, such as Iran, to move to the threshold of nuclear status. Such moves to nuclear status were facilitated enormously in the 1990s by Pakistan's chief nuclear engineer, Abdul Qadeer Khan. His network of scientists, engineers, and traders spread nuclear technology and the capacity to enrich uranium to countries such as Iran, North Korea and Lybia. Since for a variety of reasons, the NPT looks like an ineffective instrument for addressing the issue of proliferation, the Bush administration has relied on a more selective approach with which it hopes to isolate those states bent on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Estimates of the number of states participating vary widely. The original eleven founding members have grown to around 60 and perhaps as many as 66, according to various government statements and publications which, it should be noted, do not provide a list of countries in any publicly available documentation.⁴⁰ Joseph Cirincione, a knowledgeable observer of nuclear proliferation, reportedly speaks of only 21 actively participating states.⁴¹ The discrepancy is likely due

³⁹ Council on Foreign Relations 2004, 9.

⁴⁰ Sanger 2005a,b. Baker and Reese 2005. Bureau of Nonproliferation 2005. Rice 2005.

⁴¹ Fidler 2005.

to a U.S. policy that simply asks for minimal levels of cooperation to create the appearance of a large multilateral effort, when intensive cooperation actually involves many fewer states. Such cooperation can be effective; the interception of a freighter carrying nuclear components in October 2003 is widely credited to have led to Libya's abandonment of its nuclear program. But the lack of near-universal membership is also a serious liability. Pakistan has refused to join the PSI and has cooperated only in part in the effort to track down the global network that Khan had built. And without China's participation there is scant hope of enforcing an effective embargo on North Korea. The shift from a large multilateral forum, the NPT, to a much smaller one, the PSI, is in line with the general strategy of the Bush administration. Whether this shift in policy is a response merely to sharply divergent outlooks on U.S. non-proliferation policy or more general disagreements fueled by anti-American views remains unclear.

With this one caveat, we conclude that anti-Americanism has not had a major impact on the numerous deliberations on counter-terrorism in various multilateral fora since 9/11. Instead what mattered much more were the interests of all governments in jointly promoting effective counter-terrorist policies. As documented above, coordination of policy is reflected on numerous issues.⁴² Yet policy coordination has been far from perfect for one simple reason. The Bush administration is alone in framing all of world politics in terms of the war on terror and pursuing it with extreme means, war and regime change. And in so doing it has fueled the anti-Americanism that has spread since 2002.

⁴² See also Mendelsohn 2005b. This conclusion is not to deny the obvious counterfactual point that in the absence of anti-American views government policy coordination might have been even greater.

Yet perhaps surprisingly, at least in the short-term the effects of that anti-Americanism seem to have posed no major obstacles to the war on terrorism that the U.S. has waged in global as well as regional organizations, in multilateral and bilateral relations, and together with democratic and authoritarian governments.

Anti-Americanism and “Soft Power”

Joseph S. Nye defines “soft power” as being able to get others to want the outcomes you want and devotes a section of his book on the subject to anti-Americanism. Three major potential power resources may contribute to soft power: convergence of political values, an attractive culture, and policies that seem benign to others. Without stating so explicitly, Nye implies that anti-Americanism adversely affects American soft power.⁴³ Indeed, if anti-Americanism contributed to perceptions that American political values were diverging from those of the United States, or highlighted unattractive aspects of American culture, it would reduce American soft power as Nye defines it. And it certainly seems plausible that if others dislike the United States, they will be less willing to defer to American wishes and support American policy.

However, it is remarkably difficult empirically to establish the specific proposition that anti-Americanism has systematically hindered the successful conduct of American diplomacy, as Senator John Kerry claimed in his campaign for the presidency in 2004. In this section, we explore the hypothesis that anti-Americanism since 2001 has adversely affected one dimension of the soft power of the United States: the ability of the

⁴³ Nye 2004: 44.

United States to achieve its objectives through diplomatic means. BOB I THINK THIS MAKES THE PARAGRAPH TOO PONDEROUS AND I DO NOT THINK IT IS REALLY NECESSARY I Agree! We probe here whether anti-American sentiments in other societies created resistance to supporting American policy in general – quite apart from opposition to specific American policies. Empirically, it is often difficult to tell what is driving opposition or support for the United States, but conceptually it is crucial to keep in mind the difference between effects of policy opposition and effects of anti-Americanism.

Leaders of states devise strategies in a forward-looking way, hoping to achieve the best results that serve both their interests and values. A long tradition of political realism emphasizes that in the effort to be successful leaders need to subordinate their emotional reactions and ideological predispositions to strategic calculations. Such calculation should preclude the direct translation of anti-American views into policy. Instead, leaders should act as filters, ensuring that damaging actions are not taken on the basis of envy or resentment. These filters should be especially strong in non-democratic societies, but they should also operate in democracies. Certainly the effect of anti-Americanism on policy will not be as direct and simple as the effect of dislike on a personal relationship between two individuals.

We therefore should expect that when governmental elites have strong interests, and when the details of their actions are largely hidden from public view, these interests may take precedence over public views, even in democracies. Indeed, members of the public may not want to know too many of the details, since they wish for problems such

as terrorism to be dealt with effectively, without engaging their moral scruples. The controversy over the possible complicity of European intelligence services, perhaps even European governments, with growing practice of rendition of suspects held in the war on terror is a telling example. We should therefore not be too surprised to find that public opinion that is unfavorable toward the United States has not affected significantly cooperation against terrorism. However, in more public areas of diplomacy, where the stakes tend to be lower, one might well expect anti-American views to be more important.

Impacts on American Diplomacy in General

How can we test the hypothesis that anti-Americanism, as distinguished from mere opposition to American foreign policy, hinders the exercise of soft power by the United States? The most general and strongest form of this claim holds that anti-American views deeply affect relationships on issues not directly related to major political conflicts such as the war on terrorism or the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States and members of its coalition. At its most intense, anti-Americanism would be so pervasive that the United States would have difficulty persuading other states to support it on a whole range of issues in world politics.

Such across-the-board effects, at a global level, are not observed. We have reviewed a number of issue-areas in which the United States interacts regularly with other countries, and we have consulted experts with deep knowledge of these areas. There is very little evidence that anti-American opinion matters. All of the people we

consulted indicated that in their own areas of expertise, it was not an important factor. For instance, in George W. Bush's first term as President, the United States and Europe avoided serious trade wars, showing the ability to reach compromises on a variety of intrinsically contentious issues, from trade in genetically modified organisms to tax policy and subsidies for aircraft manufacturers Boeing and Airbus. If European anti-Americanism had affected trade policy, one would have expected much more bitterness and even deadlock, rather than the usual contentious politics driven by competing economic interests. Likewise, bilateral controversies on free trade agreements with such disparate countries as Australia and Morocco do not seem, from the standpoint of informed observers, to have been affected by anti-American views.⁴⁴

In other areas, also, the effects of anti-Americanism on U.S. diplomacy seem slight. There seems to be no indication that European-American cooperation in organizations such as the IMF or World Bank, or on development issues more generally, has been stymied by European anti-Americanism. Indeed, European governments not only declined to block the nomination of Paul D. Wolfowitz (often referred to as the architect of the Iraq War), but expressed considerable support for him after he discussed his views with them prior to his official selection as President of the World Bank.⁴⁵ Even negative decisions that might seem to have been motivated by anti-Americanism turn out, in the view of people with different political views who understand their complexities, to have been determined by other factors.

⁴⁴ Communications from Professor Linda Weiss (on Australia) and Rob Satloff (on Morocco), April 2005.

⁴⁵ See *New York Times*, April 3, 2005, p. 11.

This null finding is not entirely surprising. Sometimes, governments' assessments of their interests are deeply affected by mass opinions; often, however, governments have strong ideas about interests, and publics defer to their judgment as long as the results seem acceptable. For leaders to let anti-American views change their political positions would require sacrificing some interests in order to indulge in the expression of strongly held opinions or negative predispositions, or to punish the United States for its behavior on issues such as the war against Iraq. Representatives of these interests, inside and outside the government, would strenuously resist such a course of action. Unless the issues are salient and there is a particular domestic political reason to make an anti-American appeal -- such as an imminent election -- the costs to policymakers of letting one's policies be affected by anti-American views will often outweigh the benefits.

The clearest instance of a situation in which anti-American opinion does not seem to have had strong effects on American diplomacy, and where such an effect might well have been expected, is provided in a study by Professor Judith Kelley on the International Criminal Court (ICC). Beginning in 2001, the Bush Administration asked a large number of countries to sign non-surrender agreements under the American interpretation of Article 98 of the treaty creating the ICC. Kelley has studied the factors leading states to sign, or not sign, non-surrender agreements in response to U.S. requests. She argues convincingly that this situation "provides a terrific quasi-experiment," because the United States "sought an agreement with almost all states within a relatively short period of

time,” and because states did not anticipate such demands from the United States when they decided whether to ratify the ICC treaty.⁴⁶

Kelley’s main purpose is to explain decisions to sign or not sign non-surrender agreements -- that is, acceding to American demands. Her analysis shows that refusal to sign non-surrender agreements is explained by the level of a state’s commitment to the rule of law, conditional on ratification of the ICC treaty. *None* of the 27 states that had ratified the Treaty and had a strong commitment to the rule of law signed non-surrender agreements. In contrast, almost half of the states with low rule of law scores that had ratified the treaty, and well over half of states that had not ratified the Treaty, signed such agreements.⁴⁷

Kelley did a further, more detailed analysis to discover whether her results could be affected by anti-Americanism.⁴⁸ She found that publics in the seven countries that had ratified the ICC Treaty and signed non-surrender agreements viewed the U.S. more favorably than those that did not sign non-surrender agreements.⁴⁹ However, the states that cooperated with the United States had lower democracy scores than those that did not sign non-surrender agreements, suggesting that public opinion may simply be less important, on average, in states that signed the agreements. Kelley concludes that there is

⁴⁶ Kelley 2005: 3.

⁴⁷ 6 of 10 non-State Parties with high rule of law scores and 20 of 23 non-State Parties with low rule of law scores signed non-surrender agreements, compared to 21 of 44 State Parties with low rule of law scores and zero of 27 State Parties with high rule of law scores. Kelley 2005: 22 (Table 3). Beth Elise Whitaker (2005, 6) arrives at an analogous conclusion in her analysis of the adoption of anti-terror legislation in the Third World after 9/11. Authoritarian regimes were the quickest ones to comply with U.S. pressure to change their laws.

⁴⁸ Personal communication, March 15, 2005.

no convincing evidence of a relationship between public attitudes toward the United States, as measured in the 2002 Pew poll, and the signing of non-surrender agreements.⁵⁰ The absence of a significant correlation between the public's anti-American views and decisions on ICC non-surrender agreement, even in the presence of potential endogeneity and omitted variable bias, suggests that anti-Americanism has had a negligible impact on this policy domain.⁵¹

Even if United States requests are not rejected, there could be another, subtler result of anti-American views. The United States government could craft requests depending on its estimate of the likelihood of acceptance. Sometimes leaders make requests that they know will be rejected, particularly if they want to make a symbolic point or demonstrate their commitment to a policy. But often, when the potential requester anticipates rejection, she will not ask in the first place. Put differently, there can be selection effects resulting from requests not being independent of anticipated

⁴⁹ The figures in the 2002 Pew poll are 73.4% vs. 62.2%.

⁵⁰ Logit analyses, using Kelley's entire data set, do not yield significant coefficients for the variable of "U.S. image" under a variety of specifications: a basic logit equation, or equations that control for ratification, the rule of law, or simultaneously for the rule of law and democracy. Since the number of states for which data are available is relatively small (36), these results need to be interpreted with caution. We are very grateful to Professor Kelley for doing this analysis and sharing her findings with us.

⁵¹ This null finding is particularly impressive. One might have thought that even if anti-Americanism did not *cause* resistance to signing non-surrender agreements, it should be correlated with it. The causal arrow could have run strongly the other way: rather than anti-Americanism leading to refusal to agree to requests by the United States, resistance on other grounds to actual and anticipated U.S. demands could generate adverse opinion toward the United States. In such a situation a correlation could be subject to endogeneity, in which the supposed result, or variables correlated with it, explains the supposed cause. Alternatively, a correlation could result from omitted variable bias: both the purported cause (anti-American sentiment) and the purported effect (refusal to sign

responses.⁵² Some well-informed observers of the U.S. government think that beginning in the 1990s American policy-makers became more reluctant to make general requests, particularly after most American allies rejected the pleas of the U.S. government not to conclude the land mines treaty. In this view, the reflection of greater anti-Americanism would not be rejection of American requests, but the absence of such requests.⁵³

The Impact of anti-Americanism on Iraq-related Diplomacy

It seems that pervasive anti-Americanism should most strongly affect responses to highly controversial American policies, such as U.S. policy in Iraq. What, for example, happened when the U.S. government requested others to participate in the invasion and occupation of Iraq?⁵⁴ Was anti-Americanism related to decisions not to send troops, trainers, or election monitors, or to join the “Coalition of the Willing,” when the United States sent a general appeal to friendly states to join its coalition in March 2003? A

non-surrender agreements) could result from a common cause. See King, Keohane and Verba 1994, chapter 5.

⁵² Both the endogeneity effect and the selection effect would introduce systematic bias into our test. Endogeneity will inflate the magnitude of any correlation. Selection reduces variation in observed outcomes.

⁵³ Personal communication from Richard Steinberg, UCLA law school, March 2005, on the basis of conversations in Washington, DC. However, one problem with this argument is that, as we have seen, public opinion in most countries was pro-American as late as 2002. In view of this fact, it seems likely that the inability of the United States to get agreement with its views on such subjects as the land mines treaty and the International Criminal Court was less an effect of general anti-American sentiment than of deep policy disagreements between the US and its allies, and strong issue-specific public opinion (on issues such as land mines and the ICC) in allied countries.

⁵⁴ In thirty-eight countries, on average, 53 percent of the population opposed the war under all circumstances, 30 percent claimed to support it if sanctioned by the United Nations, and 8 percent supported unilateral action by the United States and its allies. In

United States Senate resolution on March 27, 2003, listed 49 countries as members of the Coalition.⁵⁵ Prior to the war, the Pew Research Center for People and the Press conducted a poll in July-October 2002 asking a question about favorable/unfavorable views of the US in 42 countries.⁵⁶ What can we learn from bringing these two sets of data together?

Before trying to answer this question, we should stop to recognize that such an analysis would be subject to bias in favor of the hypothesis that attitudes toward the United States affected decisions on war-related issues. Strong opposition to American policy can generate anti-American attitudes as well as *vice versa*, or both opposition and anti-American views can be explained, as in Chiozza's analysis in Chapter 4, by other factors such as the percentage of the population that is Muslim. Therefore, there exists a strong *ex ante* bias in favor of the proposition that pro-American attitudes will predict membership in the Coalition.

The relationship between attitudes toward the United States in 2002 and membership in the Coalition of the Willing in 2003, as listed in the Senate resolution, is

the U.S. corresponding figures were 21, 34, and 33 percent. <http://www.gallup-international.com>. Accessed 11/01/2004.

⁵⁵ See <http://www.usiraqprocon.org>. Last accessed 05/02/2005. The Heritage Foundation listed 56 countries and the Institute for Policy Studies listed 46. See also the website of "Perspectives on World History and Current Events" (PWHCE) at <http://www.pwhce.org>. Accessed 03/15/2005. The White House website contains a press release from March 21, 2003, listing 48 members. See <http://www.whitehouse.gov>. Accessed 03/15/2005.

⁵⁶ See Pew Global Attitudes Project 2002, at <http://www.people-press.org>. Last accessed 5/2/05. It is essential to examine public opinion data *prior* to the war, since we wish to test the inference that general public sentiment shaped policy toward the Iraq war, rather than *vice versa*.

displayed in Table 1a.⁵⁷ Table 1a also categorizes states by whether they had democratic or non-democratic polities in 2003. Among democratic states there is at most only a slight relationship between public attitudes toward the United States in 2002 and subsequent Coalition membership. The median favorability score of non-member democracies toward the United States is 63 percent, only nine points lower than the median score for members of the Coalition, and three members (Slovakia, South Korea and Turkey) had favorability scores lower than the median for non-members. Among non-democratic states the variation between favorability scores of members and non-members is much wider. Yet a causal inference that public opinion led to elite decisions in these non-democracies would be implausible since there are no institutionalized channels in non-democratic states by which public opinion can affect policy. Table 1b summarizes the same evidence, which does not, on the whole, support the view that anti-American mass opinion affected decisions on whether to join the Coalition.

-- Tables 1a and 1b about here --

Furthermore, anti-American views do not seem to have prevented other countries from providing economic support for American efforts in Iraq. In October 2003 a large number of governments pledged for Iraq's reconstruction \$13.5 billion at the Madrid

⁵⁷ The Senate resolution (and the White House) listed Turkey as a member of the Coalition of the Willing, which seems controversial given Turkey's parliament's refusal to permit an attack on Iraq from Turkey. Table 2, however, accepts the Senate's statement of Coalition membership. (Turkey's parliament voted in October 2003 to offer to send troops to Iraq, but this offer was rejected by Iraq.)

International Donors Conference. The largest national contributions came from countries with low levels of anti-Americanism, such as Britain, Canada, and Japan. However, the European Commission was a very large donor, and countries such as Spain, Italy, Belgium, Greece and Turkey -- all with high reported levels of anti-Americanism -- contributed to the International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFF), although France did not.⁵⁸ In November 2004, the “Paris Club” of creditors to Iraq agreed on what the Club estimated to be an 80 percent reduction in Iraqi debt. Participants included Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States -- countries with widely varying levels of public anti-Americanism.⁵⁹

To summarize our findings, the relationship between pro-Americanism in public opinion and governments’ support for American policy in Iraq is surprisingly weak. Furthermore, it is unclear whether such a relationship points to any causal linkage by which public opinion affected support for or opposition to U.S. policy.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ See U. S. State Department 2005.

⁵⁹ http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/news/page_detail_news.php?FICHER=com11011125170, November 21, 2004. Accessed 03/15/2005.

⁶⁰ Other indicators might demonstrate an effect of anti-Americanism, but as pointed out above, there are difficulties in interpretation. Some have suggested, for example, that the refusal of Germany and France not only to put their own military forces in Iraq but even to train Iraqi soldiers in Iraq, in contrast to Iraqi security personnel outside of Iraq, reflects anti-American views. The difficulty, however, is that such refusal could simply reflect strongly held policy views that invading Iraq was a major error, which these countries had opposed from the beginning. It does not necessarily reflect a negative predisposition against the United States or American society.

Regional and Conjunctural Effects of anti-Americanism on U.S. Diplomacy

The apparent absence of strong global effects of anti-Americanism on United States diplomacy does not mean that the impact of anti-Americanism is small. Its effects could be more specifically regional. Alternatively such effects could exist at specific conjunctures when decisions that would be close on other grounds, tilted against the United States by anti-American views.

Latin America offers a telling example of regional anti-Americanism. During the spring of 2005, for the first time ever, the Organization of American States (OAS) chose a candidate for Secretary-General, José Miguel Insulza of Chile, whom the United States had opposed. A United States proposal, evidently directed against Venezuela, aimed at creating a committee of the OAS to monitor democracy within countries was facing serious opposition. At the time, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela was being lionized by Latin American masses and elites alike as a symbol of opposition to the United States and the market-oriented reforms it had promoted.⁶¹

Anti-Americanism can also be consequential at specific conjunctures. Often cited in this context is the decision by the Turkish parliament on March 1, 2003 not to let American forces attack Iraq from Turkish territory. Knowledgeable commentators on this topic have attributed this decision to a variety of factors, including divisions within the Justice and Development Party (AKP), lack of explicit support by the Turkish military, and widespread opposition to the American invasion of Iraq. Such opposition was apparently motivated in part by feelings of solidarity with other Muslims, wide-spread

⁶¹ Brinkley 2005a,b; Forero 2005.

perceptions of vulnerability among all sectors of Turkish society generating distrust of U.S. and its policies, and also by fear that the American invasion would lead eventually to an independent Kurdistan.⁶²

We do not know of any systematic analysis investigating the impact of widespread anti-Americanism in Turkey on this decision. In March 2003 polls showed that 90 to 95 percent of Turks opposed Turkey's involvement in the Iraq war.⁶³ A 2003 Pew poll showed only 12 percent of Turks with a favorable view of the United States, as compared with 30 percent a year earlier.⁶⁴ It is a reasonable inference that opposition to the Iraq war was a significant factor in the sharp decline in favorable views toward America over the previous year. A keen observer of Turkish society has argued that the self-perceived vulnerability of all sectors of that society has generated distrust of the United States, and that when events transpired in 2003 by which U.S. policy seemed to threaten Turkish interests, public views turned negative.⁶⁵ Anti-Americanism may well have been a factor in Parliament's refusal to agree to the United States request, although it is impossible precisely to disentangle its effects from those of opposition to the war itself.⁶⁶

Shortly after the March 1 vote, a new government was formed under Prime Minister Rəcəp Erdoğan, the leader of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In early

⁶² Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 161-62. U.S. Congress 2003.

⁶³ Professor Heath Lowry, Princeton University, interviewed on News Hour with Jim Lehrer, October 7, 2003. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/july-dec03/turkey_10-07.html. Accessed 03/15/2005.

⁶⁴ <http://people-press.org/reports/print.php3?PageID=683>. Accessed 03/15/2005.

⁶⁵ See Barkey 2005.

⁶⁶ Personal communication from Bruce Kuniholm, Duke University, March 2005.

October 2003, his government managed to reverse the March 1 decision, authorizing the sending of Turkish troops to Iraq. At this point, a strong majority of Turks still opposed Turkish involvement in the war, although the intensity of opposition had decreased. By March 2004, the level of favorable views in Turkey toward the United States was back at 30 percent, where it had been in 2002.⁶⁷

Another crucial juncture where anti-Americanism, one might think, had an effect, occurred in March 2005. The minority government in Canada, led by Prime Minister Paul Martin, decided not to commit Canada to an integrated North American Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), despite pressure by the United States. Informed observers mention a variety of factors that were in play, including opposition to the Bush doctrine of preventive war, the Iraq war, human rights violations by the United States at Abu Ghraib Prison and elsewhere, political maneuvers by the Conservative opposition (which is not particularly anti-American), deference to the views of Quebec (which was politically important to the Liberal party at the time), and skepticism about BMD as the beginning of a policy of the militarization of space.⁶⁸ General anti-American views may have played a role. But it is impossible, with only one decision and a variety of possible causal factors, to sort out the relative importance, if any, of this particular causal factor.

Germany offers a third example of the effects that anti-Americanism can have at specific historical junctures. In July 2002 Chancellor Schröder's reelection chances looked dim. Two-thirds of the electorate viewed the Red-Green coalition negatively, and

⁶⁷ <http://people-press.org/commentary/pdf/104.pdf>. Accessed 3/15/05.

⁶⁸ Communications from Professor Michael Byers (University of British Columbia) and Louis Pauly (University of Toronto), March 2005.

while the Chancellor was leading the rival candidate of the CDU-CSU in the polls, his party was lagging behind the opposition, and the gap was widening. In launching his reelection campaign on August 5, 2003 the Chancellor warned the U.S. against possible “adventurism” in Iraq, and he criticized American economic conditions while defending the German social market economy. From the very beginning of the campaign, and before Vice-President Cheney’s bellicose speech later that month, Schröder was running as a peace candidate, with the support of over 70 percent of the German public. Aided by effective crisis-management in the floods of the Danube, Elbe and Oder valleys in the middle of August, Schröder’s resolve not to support a possible invasion of Iraq stiffened as his party began to close the gap with the opposition. Alone among the European states at this time, the Chancellor ruled out German participation in a military intervention even if that intervention were backed by the United Nations. The opposition candidate Stoiber charged the Chancellor repeatedly with isolating Germany and ruining a foreign policy record as a champion of strong trans-Atlantic relations. Aware of the strong public opposition of a possible invasion, Stoiber, too, condemned American unilateralism, and, according to two different reports, stated publicly, a few days before the election, that he might bar U.S. forces from using German bases, should the United States decide to attack without UN support. As is true of the Turkish and Canadian episodes, in this case too it is simply impossible to draw from only one decision any valid causal inferences as to the existence of a systematic anti-American bias. Yet it is quite often possible, even plausible, to argue that anti-American views can matter greatly at specific conjunctures. In addition to the cases of Germany, Turkey, and Canada, it could well be that other

decisions – such as that of Mexican President Fox not to support the United States resolution on Iraq in the Security Council in March 2003 – were influenced by anti-American sentiment as well as specific opposition to the American policy at issue.

This survey of the possible effects of anti-Americanism on soft power suggests that at specific conjunctures, anti-Americanism may have exerted significant effects on state policies that were important to the United States. Yet in each case, refusal to support the United States could be as well explained by opposition to American policy as by anti-Americanism. As noted earlier, it is crucial to make a clear distinction between opposition to American policy and anti-Americanism, in order to avoid attributing to anti-Americanism what should be attributed instead to responses to specific U.S. policies.

Overall, our survey provides little reason to expect that a more systematic analysis would identify general short-term policy effects. Even on issues such as ICC non-surrender agreements and the Coalition of the Willing, where significant correlations could be expected (whether reflecting causality or not), such correlations are either not found or extremely weak. In the absence of compelling evidence to the contrary, we cannot reject the null hypothesis -- that anti-Americanism has failed to have measurable, direct effects on the ability of the United States to attain its diplomatic objectives. Yet the *caveats* that we introduced at the beginning of this chapter must be kept in mind. A continuation of policies such as those at Abu Graib, Guantanamo, and apparently at secret CIA sites around the world could undermine the sense among America's potential friends that the United States exemplifies the values of a liberal democracy. That sentiments of anti-Americanism as expressed to pollsters do not correlate strongly with

policy does not preclude the possibility that American soft power is being undermined through a gradual process of erosion.⁶⁹ Our finding does, however, make us reluctant to embrace the common conclusion that deeply engrained anti-Americanism – as distinct from the policies of the Bush administration -- has dramatically undermined or reversed the soft power of the United States.

Direct Action by Individuals and Groups

As noted above, two possible ways for individuals or groups to express their anti-American views would be to boycott brand-name products associated with the United States, and to refuse to travel as tourists to the United States. We consider both domains in turn.

Boycotts of Brand-Name Products

Is anti-Americanism consequential for organizations operating abroad under an American label? It is plausible to believe that people who feel hostile toward the United States would be reluctant to purchase products from American firms, especially those products associated strongly with the United States.⁷⁰ *A priori*, corporations that are closely identified with the United States seem quite

⁶⁹ We are grateful to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., for written comments on an earlier draft of this chapter, which have helped us to clarify this point.

⁷⁰ We have done some exploratory work on non-profit organizations, conducting two interviews with high officials of environmental organizations that operate on a global basis. Neither official indicated that the organization had encountered any significant obstacles in their work due to anti-Americanism, including in Muslim

vulnerable to boycotts because these corporations are often perceived to be part of an American “power structure.” Trust in major U.S. corporations (such as Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, Burger King, UPS, Kraft, Procter & Gamble, and Johnson & Johnson) was recently reported as running at about 40 percent in Europe compared to 70 percent in the United States.⁷¹

Some recent survey evidence suggests that anti-Americanism in Europe is indeed affecting consumer behavior toward American firms. In a December 2004 poll, conducted by Global Market Insite,⁷² 1,000 consumers in each of eight countries (Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, UK, US) were asked two questions about 53 American companies: would they avoid American products because of recent American foreign policy and military action; and to what extent did they regard particular companies as “extremely American.” Overall, 20 per cent of European and Canadian consumers reported that they were consciously avoiding American products. Firms perceived as most subject to consumer boycotts included American Airlines, United Airlines, General Motors, Wal-Mart, CNN, American Express, McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, and Marlboro, with firms such as Nike not far behind. Not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between firms perceived as closely identified with the United States and firms that consumers reported consciously deciding to boycott.

societies such as Indonesia. For a description of one NGO’s battle with Coca-Cola see Stecklow 2005.

⁷¹ Edelman 2005, 2, 5.

⁷² www.worldpoll.com.

Anecdotal reports in the press also suggest that sales of US firms have been affected. For example, in March and April of 2003, several news stories trumpeted boycotts against American firms such as McDonald's and Coca-Cola. Will Hutton asserted that the center of the boycott movement was in Germany and that "the boycotts and the surrounding avalanche of negative publicity are a storm waning of what may lie ahead."⁷³ A German restaurant boycott of American products was reported by Reuters to have spread rapidly in the days after the war in Iraq began:

"Diners at the Osteria Restaurant in Berlin are finding that 'things go better without Coke' and are ordering Germany's long overshadowed imitation of 'the real thing' -- the slightly sweeter "Afri-Cola" -- to express their outrage. 'We wanted to do something to express our annoyance,' Osteria owner Frabio Angile told Reuters. 'We want to hit America where it hurts -- in their wallets.'"⁷⁴

Looking back on more than a year and a half of experience since the Iraq War began, the *Financial Times* reported as follows:⁷⁵

Coca-Cola, which makes 80 percent of its profits outside North America, sold 16 percent less beverage to Germans in the third quarter of 2004 than a year previously. MacDonald's blamed

⁷³ "Goodbye, Coke. Hello, Mecca Cola." *Washington Post*, April 18, 2003.

⁷⁴ Erik Kirschbaum, "EU Consumers Boycotting Starbucks, McDonald's, and Coca-Cola in War Protest," Reuters, March 25, 2003.

<http://www.organicconsumers.org/Starbucks/boycott032703.cfm>. Accessed 03/03/2005.

⁷⁵ *Financial Times* (12/30/04): 7.

falling German sales for virtually eliminating growth across Europe. Altria sold 24.5 percent fewer Marlboro cigarettes in France and 18.7 percent fewer in Germany during the third quarter [of 2004].

Readers of such reports should pause and recognize that the sharp fall in Coca-Cola's beverage sales in Germany in the third quarter of 2004 coincided with a new bottling law. Furthermore, since anti-Americanism seems to have peaked in Europe in 2003, it would have been very strange indeed to observe a sharp decline in sales because of a gradual decline in anti-Americanism between 2003 and 2004.

Tables 2a and 2b offer more systematic data. We examined the revenues of three major US-based consumer products firms and three European competitors, in Europe, between 2000 and 2004. These firms include three American firms often mentioned as potential targets of anti-American boycotts: Coca-Cola, McDonald's, and Nike. We chose these firms since they are likely targets of a consumer boycott motivated by anti-American views, have substantial European sales, and information was available on their sales by world region.⁷⁶ We included three European firms -- Adidas-Solomon, Cadbury-Schweppes, and

⁷⁶ We originally sought to include Pepsi-Co also, but its reports do not break out sales by region in a sufficiently disaggregated way to permit meaningful comparisons. Had we included figures for Pepsi-Co non-North American sales, our overall conclusions would have been unchanged.

Nestle -- as controls. They compete with the American firms and are similarly multinational.

If anti-Americanism had a significant impact on sales, one should find U.S.-based firms' sales falling in 2003-04, when anti-American views rose sharply in Europe, compared to 2000-2001, when the United States was still very popular there. This fall in the sales of American firms should occur both in absolute terms and relative to the performance of European firms.

--Tables 2a and 2b about here--

Tables 2a and 2b demonstrate that American firms in Europe did not suffer in the aftermath of the Iraq war. Between 2000-01 and 2003-04 all six firms increased their European sales. Furthermore, all three American firms increased the *share* of their revenues deriving from Europe. Between 2000-01 and 2003-04 the average sales gain in for the three American firms was over one-third, compared to about one-quarter for the three European firms.⁷⁷ Details aside, it is safe to say that during this period the American firms did not suffer, in their European sales, compared to the European firms. Our research shows that American corporations have performed strongly in Europe, stronger than large European firms operating in similar markets.

⁷⁷ Precise comparison is not possible here, since Coca-Cola's figures include Asia and the firm's reported gains between 2000-01 and 2003-03 are probably inflated as a result.

This evidence is consistent with statements by business leaders. Keith Reinhard, President of Business for Diplomatic Action, declares that “research across much of the globe shows that consumers are cooling toward American culture and American brands, but there is still no hard evidence showing direct impact on bottom lines.”⁷⁸ Ronald DeFeo, chief executive of the Terex Corporation, has a point when he argues that “the multinationals that focus on customers, not politics, can still do business. If we go back on our heels and think about world politics, we should go back to the university.”⁷⁹ Informally, business leaders report that although anti-Americanism makes business harder to conduct, there are ways to alleviate it, whether through brand-names that do not suggest American ownership or by putting Palestinian employees rather than Americans on al-Jazeera.⁸⁰ We conclude that reports of consumer anti-Americanism damaging sales of U.S.-based firms in Europe are highly exaggerated. If anti-Americanism ever posed a serious threat to American business in Europe, corporate strategies have been able to avert dramatic negative effects.

Effects of anti-Americanism on Tourism to the United States

Worldwide, tourism fell after 9/11, then recovered strongly. The United States was an exception to this general trend. Between 2000 and 2003, tourism to the United States fell twenty percent, twice as much as Mexico and Canada. On average, the other top seven tourism destinations (six European countries and China) experienced a slight increase in tourist arrivals during that time.⁸¹ These aggregate data are no more than

⁷⁸ Interview reported in *The Corporate Citizen* (September-October 2005), quoted in Sophie Meunier, chapter 5, p. 28 (June draft). Mr. Reinhard goes on to warn that “in marketing, we know that attitude precedes behavior, and the warning signs are there.”

⁷⁹ Quoted in Holstein 2005.

⁸⁰ See Guyon 2003.

⁸¹ World Tourism Organization 2003.

suggestive. Apart from anti-Americanism there exist numerous plausible explanations for this pattern. They include fear of travel to the United States and real or anticipated difficulties in obtaining visas due to stricter U.S. controls.⁸² To test whether it is plausible to associate the decline in tourist travel to the U.S. with anti-Americanism, we need to establish whether these declines were particularly sharp from those countries in which anti-Americanism views were running especially high.

--Table 3 about here --

We offer a crude test with the data in Table 3. We have selected nine countries for which data are available on changes in tourism to the United States, between 2001 and 2003, and on general levels (among urban populations) of pro- or anti-American views. Since we are trying to make inferences about foreigners' decisions to visit the United States, not about American measures to restrict such visits, we have excluded countries that were particular objects of U.S. border security measures and visa restrictions. Table 3 shows that there is not a strong correlation between anti-Americanism and changes in tourism.

Table 3 is deficient in two ways: we do not have data on *changes* in levels of anti-American opinion between 2001 and 2003 for all of these countries, and the exchange rates of various currencies *vis a vis* the dollar fluctuated differentially. Although there is no correlation between exchange rate fluctuations and tourism, this does constitute a

⁸² The fall in the value of the dollar over this period should enhance tourism to the United

complicating factor. Furthermore, visa requirements could have been tightened differentially. In Table 4 we therefore focus only on the three states in the euro zone -- France, Germany, and Italy -- for which we have data on changes in levels of anti-Americanism between 2001 and 2003. The most we can say on the basis of Table 4 is that there exists no strong linear relationship between declines in favorable views of the United States and changes in tourism.

The negative findings on consumer boycotts are stronger than on tourism. On balance the available evidence, spotty as it is, does not support the widespread conjecture that to date anti-Americanism has had a major effect on the economic choices of individuals and groups.

Long-Term and Indirect Effects

At first glance it may be surprising that we could not find strong evidence tracking the effects of anti-Americanism for United States diplomacy or individual actions toward America and firms identified with America. Yet since the measure of anti-Americanism on which we have primarily relied in this chapter is public opinion, this finding may be less surprising than it seems. For half a century, studies of public opinion have pointed out that the effect of mass opinion on foreign policy is quite diffuse.⁸³ As we have

States since it made visiting America cheaper from both Europe and Japan.

⁸³ A classic early work is Almond 1950.

emphasized throughout this volume, many aspects of anti-Americanism cannot be captured by public opinion data.⁸⁴

Stopping our analysis of the effects of anti-Americanism at this point would leave it incomplete. Persistently critical opinion creates conditions that in the longer-term can yield unforeseen anti-American effects. The connection between opinion (or distrust and bias) on the one hand and international cooperation on the other is mediated by domestic politics, such as through social movements or political institutions, which shape the political options that are available to decision-makers seeking to fashion international strategies. We need to understand these intervening links in order to come to a reasoned assessment of the longer-term and indirect effects of anti-Americanism.

Doug McAdam's chapter highlights the broader and often unintended long-term effects of the Civil Rights movement – the collapse of the New Deal coalition, the loss to the Republicans of virtually all of the African-American vote for a generation, the increased visibility of African-Americans in public life, the movement opposing the Vietnam war, and the increased rejection of the integrationist model by African-Americans. These effects were not appreciated at the time, and are not recognized even today by many white Americans who subscribe to the dominant narrative of the civil rights movement as an unalloyed success in helping African-Americans to overcome many of the disadvantages they had faced in the United States. McAdam argues analogously that the ebb and flow of diffuse anti-American views provides the ground on which political elites can mobilize movements and organize groups during episodes of

⁸⁴ Comments by Kenneth Schultz and Page Fortna helped us clarify the points in this

contention. When such movements get institutionalized and seize power at the national level, the room for cooperation with the United States shrinks, perhaps drastically, as the domestic constituency of the government prohibits adoption of policies that appear to be too favorable or accommodating to the demands of the U.S. government. The fact that the opportunity costs of a policy which strengthens anti-Americanism may be difficult to measure, does not mean that they cannot be consequential. For example, after two decades of neo-liberal reform policies informed by the “Washington consensus” of the U.S. Treasury and the IMF with very disappointing results, many Latin American governments have now adopted a left-wing complexion and are feeling strong domestic pressures to resist U.S. political initiatives.

The longer-term consequences of anti-Americanism are complex and difficult to predict. Sophie Meunier argues in her chapter that French anti-Americanism is deeply ingrained and is reacting strongly to the perceived threat of losing France’s cultural distinctiveness and resisting the unilateral impulses of American foreign policy. Yet only two decades ago, French reaction to the reassertion of American power in the 1980s was muted at best. The pacifism that was so strong in Germany was virtually nonexistent in France. In the 1990s more than any other country, it was French officials who pushed in the EU, the IMF, and the OECD for creating consensually agreed-upon rules for globalization, yet agreement with many American policies in the 1980s and 1990s did not constrain the French, beginning in the 1990s, from fiercely protesting perceived threats of cultural globalization. Diffuse and latent, but well-established, anti-American attitudes

paragraph.

provided the ground from which, under changed circumstances, French elites could fashion popular policies opposing the United States.

This episode alerts us to the existence of intervening links between opinion, distrust and bias, on the one hand, and international policy cooperation, on the other. But these linkages are different under different types of political systems, and in the context of different historical experiences. French anti-Americanism is so deeply institutionalized that, in contrast to Germany, politicians do not pay a price for invoking it. At times the same is also true of China where politicians and intellectuals must watch carefully the policy line of the government in order to fit into the prevailing tone of anti- or pro-Americanism. (In contrast, no member of the Chinese elite can expect to avoid paying a high price for articulating pro-Japanese views.) Since the legitimation needs of the Chinese government are variable, so is the usefulness of anti-Americanism. While French anti-Americanism is deeply institutionalized and moves from the top down toward a generally receptive mass public, China's anti-Americanism wells up from the grass roots. Elites react to events and seek to mold the anti-Americanism that presents them with both challenges to the regime's stability and opportunities for reaffirming its shaky legitimacy. In both cases, it is not merely public opinion, but a conjunction of public attitudes and elite interests, that activates anti-Americanism and makes it consequential.

In Indonesia, as John Bowen demonstrates in chapter 8, anti-Americanism has less traction and is less deeply institutionalized than in France, so it tends to be more sporadic. Furthermore, the impact of anti-Americanism on policy seems to have been affected by the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. Under Suharto anti-

Americanism was anathema to the regime, and oppositional groups paid a high price for being perceived to be “anti-American.” After Suharto’s fall, under the conditions of a fledgling democracy, shifting political circumstances and coalitions are conditioning the political use of anti-Americanism and therefore its consequences. Yet, as in France and China, for anti-American attitudes to become significant for policy, political entrepreneurs need to have interests in using rather than suppressing them.

Unlike Indonesia, Germany did not experience a change in political regime in recent decades. Yet, even within a given regime type, anti-Americanism can take surprisingly complex twists and turns over time, with consequences for policy. The anti-Americanism of Germany’s “1968 generation,” which had protested against the Vietnam war, turned into surprising support of United States policy in the Kosovo war on the part of the Green Party and their leader, eventual foreign minister Joschka Fischer. As in the other cases the existence of diffuse anti-American views provides political leaders with the political material from which to fashion coalitions and strategies.

Whether and how attitudes, coalitions and strategies congeal into more enduring institutional patterns is central to our assessment of the long-term political effects of the current, unprecedented wave of anti-Americanism. Such coalescence has occurred in France, where anti-Americanism is deeply sedimented.⁸⁵ But it is not yet evident in Germany, Indonesia, or even China. Local circumstances involving the legitimacy of established political elites and the opportunities available to challengers are likely to be important, in the long run, in shaping whether anti-American attitudes become embedded

⁸⁵ Roger 2005.

in social movements and political organizations in these countries. The fact that accurate predictions about the long-term, indirect effects of anti-Americanism are difficult in no way undermines their substantive importance for American foreign policy and world politics.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter suggests that even high levels of expressed anti-Americanism do not translate readily into government or individual action. Even when anti-American sentiments could be largely a result of recent American foreign policy, their effects are often less strong than one might have expected. Consumers do not boycott the products of American corporations even when they say they do. International travel shows no more than a faint correspondence to variations in anti-American views. Governments cooperate with the United States on counter-terrorism in various ways, and, despite upsurges in anti-American views at home, they are maintaining ordinary diplomatic relations across a variety of policy domains.. When we attempt more carefully to examine the effects of prior anti-Americanism on responses to the United States, doubts about the effects of anti-Americanism are reinforced. We find a remarkably weak association between popular views toward the United States in mid-2002 (before issues involving a possible invasion of Iraq became salient) and decisions by governments to join the American war in Iraq through participation in the Coalition of the Willing. We also found no significant correlation between anti-American views in 2002 and refusal to sign non-surrender agreements with the United States under Article 98 of the treaty establishing

the ICC. (A major albeit regional rather than global exception to this null finding is the recent and growing resistance in Latin America to the exercise of United States influence).

To conclude from this evidence that anti-Americanism does not matter, however, would be to miss the forest for the trees. Some big decisions, such as those involving the Turkish decision on Iraq and the German elections of 2002, almost certainly have been affected by negative predispositions against the United States, although in these cases it is difficult to distinguish the effects of anti-Americanism from the effects of opposition to the US effort to persuade other countries to join its attack on Iraq. Over the longer term, a combination of disagreement with United States policy and distaste for perceived American arrogance and hypocrisy may well lead other publics and elites to be more negatively predisposed toward the United States -- and more unwilling, therefore, to be persuaded by the United States of the existence of common interests. Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and other prisons where suspects in the war on terror are being held have become symbols of American arrogance and hypocrisy. When an American weekly reported, and subsequently retracted, that a copy of the Koran had reportedly been flushed down a toilet so as to degrade and humiliate Muslims held captive in American prisons, deadly riots broke out in several Arab countries. The retraction of the story by *Newsweek* magazine under intense pressure from the White House was overshadowed by the subsequent release of numerous reports about desecration of the Koran in 2002-03 by

American military interrogators or guards.⁸⁶ Over the medium- and long-term such events could easily harden anti-American views by consolidating distrust and bias.

Despite ominous trends, especially in the Middle East, the effects of anti-American public opinion on governmental or individual behavior toward the United States seem to have been relatively weak, at least so far. The burden of proof is on those who claim that anti-American opinion, as distinguished from opposition to particular United States foreign policies, has had significant policy effects.

To us there are three plausible explanations for this finding. First, as Chiozza demonstrates in chapter 4, views of the United States in 2002 were largely positive. Second, even when (after 2003) attitudes toward the United States become more negative, their expression in terms of policy was inhibited by the fact that individuals and states have interests -- in purchasing desirable products, traveling to interesting places, and in benefiting from cooperation with the world's preeminent power, or at least not antagonizing it. Although some of those perceptions of interest may be affected by American words and actions -- and therefore subject to variation depending on predispositions toward the United States -- many of them are likely to be based on other values. Third, the potential targets of anti-Americanism -- businesses, non-profit organizations, or the American government itself -- may devise effective strategies to combat it or mitigate its effects. As a result, if anti-Americanism has significant direct effects on the influence of the United States in world politics, they are not general and across-the-board, but more regional and specific to particular situations.

⁸⁶ Sengupta and Masood 2005. Lewis 2005. Shanker 2005. Schmitt 2005.

The weakness of the identifiable effects of anti-Americanism sheds some light on the question raised in chapter 1: does anti-Americanism reflect opinion or bias? Some groups, such as parts of the French elite or small segments of Islamic movements, hold to anti-American attitudes that reflect deep distrust and systematic bias. Firmly held, such attitudes discourage cooperation with the United States and are not susceptible to change on the basis of new information. The relatively scattered and specific effects that we have discovered, however, suggest that opinions about the United States are more mixed than one would expect were deep distrust and bias widespread. They therefore tend to reinforce the conclusion of Giacomo Chiozza in chapter 4: attitudes toward the United States are remarkably differentiated by issue, and consistently strong and negative feelings, across many dimensions, are rare. If anti-American attitudes were principally fueled by distrust or bias, they should be more persistent and exert more clearly identifiable effects than in fact they do.

What then accounts for the persistence of heterogeneous anti-American attitudes that appear to have relatively small and specific effects? In the concluding chapter to this volume we will explore one possible answer: that American symbols are polyvalent. They embody a variety of values with different meanings to different people and indeed even to the same individual. We examine whether America's polyvalence helps us understand the odd mixture that we have observed -- strongly expressed negative views coupled with few changes in behavior? The disjunction we have uncovered between anti-American attitudes and actions prompts us to analyze America's symbolic projection abroad.

Table 1a. Pew “Favorable to US Scores,” (Pew 2002) by Polity Type

<i>Type of Polity: Member of Coalition of the Willing?</i>	Member of Coalition of the Willing:	Non-Member	N:
Democratic	[11] Philippines (90) Honduras (80) Ukraine (80) Poland (79) UK (75) Bulgaria (72) Japan (72) Italy (70) Slovakia (60) S. Korea (53) Turkey (30) <i>Median: 72</i>	[20] Ghana (83) Guatemala (82) Venezuela (82) Kenya (80) Mali (75) Canada (72) Czech Rep. (71) Peru (67) S. Africa (65) Mexico (64) France (63) Germany (61) Indonesia (61) Russia (61) Senegal (61) Bolivia (57) India (54) Brazil (52) Bangladesh (45) Argentina (34) <i>Median: 63</i>	31
Non-Democratic	[3] Uzbekistan (85) Uganda (74) Angola (54) <i>Median: 74</i>	[6] Ivory Coast (84) Vietnam (71) Lebanon (35) Jordan (25) Pakistan (10) Egypt (6) <i>Median: 30</i>	9
N:	14	26	40

Note :

Table 1a lists all forty countries polled by Pew in 2002 that had Polity IV scores for 2003 either -2 or below (clearly non-democratic) or +6 and above (clearly democratic). Two countries were omitted because their categorization would be ambiguous: Tanzania (with a score of 2) and Nigeria (with a score of 4). Polity scores (2003) are drawn from:

<http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity> (accessed 5/26/05). Coalition of the Willing membership is taken from Senate Resolution of March 27, 2003: <http://www.usiraqprocon.org> (accessed 5/26/05).

Table 1b. Summary of Associations among Public Attitudes, Democracy and Membership in the Coalition of the Willing

Democratic countries:

Pew favorability:	Member:	Non-Member:	N:
Pro-US (over 50%)	10	18	28
Anti-US (under 50%)	1	2	3
N:	11	20	31

Non-Democratic countries:

Pew favorability:	Member:	Non-Member:	N:
Pro-US (over 50%)	3	2	5
Anti-US (under 50%)	0	4	4
N:	3	6	9

Table 2a: Sales of Selected American and European firms (with percentages of total firm sales in Europe).

	2000-01 ave.	2002	2003	2004	2003-04 ave.
US firms:					
Coca-Cola*	3,945 (23)	5,262 (27)	6,556 (31)	7,195 (33)	6,875 (32)
McDonalds	4,753 (33)	5,136 (33)	5,875 (34)	6,737 (35)	6,105 (35)
Nike**	2,496 (27)	2,731 (28)	3,242 (30)	3,834 (31)	3,538 (31)
Euro firms:					
Addidas-Solomon	2962 (50)	3200 (49)	3365 (54)	3470 (54))	3418 (54)
Cadbury Schweppes	1883 (41)	2263 (43)	2809 (44)	2899 (43)	2854 (43)
Nestle'	26,513 (32)	28,068 (31)	28,574 (32)	28,563 (33)	28,569 (33)

Figures for US firms are in millions of dollars for the European market. Figures for Addison-Solomon are in Euros, Cadbury-Schweppes in Pounds Sterling, Nestle' in Swiss francs. Figures are derived from SEC/Annual Report filings.

* European figures include Euroasia and Middle East.

** European figures include Middle East and Africa.

Table 2b. Sales as percentages of 2000-01 average sales

	2000-01 ave.	2002	2003	2004	2003-04 ave.
US firms:					
Coca-Cola*	100	133	166	182	174
McDonalds	100	108	123	141	128
Nike**	100	109	130	154	142
US firm average:	100	117	140	159	149
Euro firms:					
Addidas-Solomon	100	108	114	117	115
Cadbury Schweppes	100	120	149	154	152
Nestle'	100	106	108	108	108
European firm average:	100	109	124	126	125

The percentages in this table are based on the figures reported in Table 2a.

Table 3. Comparison between 2004 Opinion toward the United States with 2001-03 Changes in Tourist travel to the United States.

Country:	Percentage favorable to US, 2004	Rank, unfavorable (most “anti-American”) first:	Change in tourism to US, 2001-2003, in percent:	Rank, largest decline first:
France	31	1	-21.3	3
Germany	39	2	-10.1	5
Netherlands	44	3	-9.2	6
U.K.	46	4	-3.9	7
Japan	47	5	-22.4	2
China	53	6	-33.3	1
Italy	58	7	-13.3	4
Denmark	65	8	-0.8	8
India	68	9	+1.0	9

Sources:

For opinion data: GMI 2004.

For tourism data: World Tourism Organization 2004.

Note:

Between July 1, 2001 and July 1, 2003, the euro appreciated 37% against the dollar, the Danish krone 26.9%, the British pound 17%, the yen 4%, and the rupee 1.1%. The value of the Chinese yuan remained constant. See <http://www.imf.org>, and click on “exchange rate archives.” Accessed 03/05/2005. If exchange rates were determining tourism, countries with the greatest currency appreciation during the 2001-2003 period should show the largest declines in tourism. The rank order of decline would be: France/Germany/Netherlands/Italy, Denmark, UK, Japan, India, China. These do not match well with the results. China and Japan experienced the largest declines in tourism, although their currencies appreciated not at all or very little against the dollar.

Table 4. Changes in Tourism and changes in anti-Americanism: Eurozone.

<i>Country:</i>	<i>Anti-Americanism: % decline in favorable views of US, 2002-04</i>	<i>Rank, strongest shift toward Anti- Americanism</i>	<i>Tourism to US, change, 2001- 03</i>	<i>Rank, from largest to smallest decline</i>
<i>France</i>	<i>51</i>	<i>1</i>	<i>-21.3</i>	<i>1</i>
<i>Germany</i>	<i>34</i>	<i>2</i>	<i>-10.1</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Italy</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>-13.3</i>	<i>2</i>

Sources: For opinion data: Pew 2004 and GMI 2004. For tourism data: World Tourism Organization 2004.

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